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AbstrAct: In recent years, there has been a trend in 
psychiatry to try and explain disorders of action in 
terms of an over-reliance on the habitual mode of ac-
tion. In particular, it has been hypothesized that com-
pulsions in obsessive-compulsive disorder are driven 
by maladaptive habits. In this paper, I argue that this 
view of obsessive-compulsive disorder does not fit the 
phenomenology of the disorder in many patients, and 
that a more refined conceptualization of habit is likely 
to be helpful in clarifying the distinctions between dis-
orders of action. There are thus two aims to this paper. 
The first is to highlight the issues pertaining to the view 
that compulsions are the result of an over-reliance on 
the habitual mode of action, leading to a loss of agen-
tive control. The second aim is to examine the view 
of agentive control implicit in those accounts, and see 
how other conceptions of agentive control might do a 
better job at accounting for the distinct ways in which 
persons suffering from pathologies of action may be 
said to lack control.
Keywords: Agentive control, Disorders of action, 
Obsessive-compulsive disorder
In recent years, researchers in psychiatry have proposed explaining disorders of action in terms of an over-reliance on the habitual 
mode of action. In particular, it has been hypoth-
esized that compulsions in obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD) are driven by maladaptive habits. 
In this paper, I challenge this view on different 
fronts. First, as a few authors have observed, this 
hypothesis is not in line with the phenomenology 
of the disorder in many patients. Second, the habit 
view, which aims to explain all disordered action 
(compulsions, impulses, addictive behaviors) as 
deriving from an over-reliance on the habitual 
mode of action, neglects the crucial differences 
between these kinds of actions, especially between 
compulsions and impulses. I propose that a more 
refined conceptualization of habit is likely to be 
helpful in clarifying the distinctions between dis-
orders of action. There are thus two aims to this 
paper. The first is to highlight some issues pertain-
ing to the view that compulsions in OCD are the 
result of an over-reliance on the habitual mode 
of action, leading to a loss of agentive control. 
The second and more original aim of this paper 
is to examine the view of agentive control that is 
implicit in those accounts, and explore how other 
conceptions of agentive control might do a better 
job at accounting for the distinct ways in which 
persons suffering from pathologies of action may 
be said to lack control. How can we account for 
the different ways in which agents who act impul-
sively (such as patients with addiction, attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder, or impulse-control 
disorders) and agents who act compulsively, can be 
said to lack control? While other researchers have 
pointed out that compulsive and impulsive actions 
have distinct properties, I am offering a new way 
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of conceptualizing this distinction by taking at-
tention as the central criterion of agentive control.
In the first section of the paper, I discuss the 
hypothesis according to which compulsions in 
OCD are driven by maladaptive habits. I then rely 
on recent literature in philosophy and psychology 
to highlight the fact that the “behavioral parallel” 
between habitual actions and compulsions drawn 
by defendants of this theory does not account for 
the different phenomenological bases underlying 
habitual and compulsive actions. Compulsions 
do not seem to be performed without conscious 
attention, or unintentionally. On the contrary, 
compulsive agents might be exerting excessive 
conscious control over their actions, causing them 
to constantly doubt their performances (have I 
washed my hands correctly or enough?). This 
feeling of insecurity towards one’s actions inhibits 
the normal process of habit formation, and un-
dermines the agent’s ability to act spontaneously 
and unreflectively, so that she needs to resort to 
deliberation and focused attention to perform 
routine actions. In fact, it has been argued that 
OCD patients’ recourse to conscious control is 
precisely what diminishes their sense of agency 
(de Haan, Rietveld & Denys, 2015).
What are the implications of this with regard to 
the taxonomy of unreflective actions, and particu-
larly with regard to compulsivity and impulsivity 
(such as displayed in addiction, impulse-control 
disorders, or attention deficit hyperactivity disor-
der)? I will examine a few different conceptions of 
agentive control as implying inhibition, guidance, 
and attentional focus, and the extent to which 
they enable us to account for the different ways in 
which agents who act impulsively, compulsively, 
and habitually can be said to lack control. We will 
see that, on a certain view of control, impulsivity 
and compulsivity can be viewed as two opposite 
excessive dispositions on a spectrum. Refining 
our view of agentive control therefore has fruitful 
implications for our understanding of the distinct 
kinds of unreflective action, including the ones 
found in disorders of action.
Finally, I discuss issues pertaining to the defini-
tion of habit as a single construct opposing goal-
directed behavior, in light of recent work in the 
philosophy of action. Indeed, while we rely on 
unreflective skillful actions most of the time, our 
behaviors do not seem either stereotyped or de-
prived of a purpose. The view according to which 
habitual actions are disconnected from the agent’s 
intentions and goals is an implausible one.
Compulsion as Habit
In recent years, researchers in psychiatry have 
proposed to explain disorders of action such as 
addiction, OCDs and impulse-control disorders 
in terms of an over-reliance on a habitual mode of 
action (Everitt & Robbins, 2004; Graybiel, Rauch, 
2000; Page et al., 2009). The habit theory has be-
come prominent for explaining how subjects can 
maintain persistent patterns of actions in the ab-
sence of a reward which would act as a motivation, 
and as such it seems to complement the motivation 
theory (Sjoerds, Luigjes, Van Den Brink, Denys, 
& Yücel, 2014). However, as we shall see, this 
theory also raises the question of our conceptual 
understanding of what habits, or habitual actions, 
are. Indeed, we can wonder whether associating 
the habitual modes of action upon which we rely 
to perform routine actions with the compulsions 
performed by a person with OCD is conceptually 
helpful. In what follows, I will briefly expose the 
habit theory of compulsions, before questioning 
several of its assumptions.
OCD is characterized by the repetition of 
routine, everyday actions (such as locking the 
door, turning off the stove, washing one’s hands) 
in response to an intruding fear (that the house 
will burn, that one will get contaminated, etc.). 
This has led researchers to hypothesize that flex-
ible, goal-directed action control is compromised 
in OCD, and that compulsive acts are instead 
driven by maladaptive habits (Boulougouris, 
Chamberlain, Robbins, 2009; Graybiel, Rauch, 
2000; Page et al., 2009). For instance, Gillan et 
al. (2011) argue that, in the same way as it has 
been suggested for drug and gambling addiction, 
an imbalance between habitual and goal-directed 
control may underlie the urge to perform compul-
sive acts in OCD sufferers. What may be happen-
ing, it is argued, is that patients with OCD rely 
excessively on the habitual mode, resulting in the 
repeated performance of actions in the absence of 
a goal or reward.
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As Gillian et al. suggest, washing one’s hands 
before preparing a meal may constitute a goal-
directed action that is performed to avoid con-
tamination. However, after multiple repetitions of 
this action, the habitual system can begin to take 
control. When the habitual system takes over, we 
find greater efficiency in action, but also a loss 
of behavioral flexibility. It is in this sense that an 
agent who relies excessively on the habitual sys-
tem can be said to lack control over his actions. 
According to the authors, this loss of flexibility 
in action characteristic of the habitual system is 
exemplified by “slips of action.” For instance, 
when a person who intends to retrieve her keys 
from the kitchen counter is driven by the “kitchen 
environment” to go wash her hands instead, her 
habitual response of hand washing is not seen as 
goal-directed and lacks flexibility insofar as it is 
“triggered” by the kitchen environment (Gillan 
et al., 2011). The hypothesis is that, in a similar 
manner, persons with OCD rely persistently on the 
habitual system, leading to uncontrolled behaviors 
such as repetitive hand washing.
This hypothesis, which associates the compul-
sive hand washing of OCD sufferers with the ha-
bitual hand washing we may engage in automati-
cally when entering the kitchen, is partly based on 
supposed “behavioral parallels” between habits 
and compulsions. The underlying idea is that 
since habitual action is synonymous to a deficit 
in goal-directed action control, and compulsions 
occur when an agent uncontrollably performs an 
action repeatedly without a goal, then compulsions 
might result from an over-reliance on a habitual 
mode of action.
This hypothesis rests on multiple assumptions; 
assumptions regarding the nature of habits on the 
one hand, and regarding the nature of compulsive 
acts on the other. In what follows, I discuss the 
plausibility of this view of compulsions, and pres-
ent an alternative view of the relationship between 
compulsions and habits, which will attempt to 
better account for the phenomenology of compul-
sions in OCD patients.
Compulsion as inhibition of habit
The habit theory of compulsions rests on multiple 
assumptions, including a “behavioral parallel” 
between habits and compulsions, where habits 
are understood as somewhat “mindless” and, 
importantly, as non-goal-directed. If compulsions 
performed by patients with OCD might at first 
appear to bear such characteristics, a closer look 
at compulsions makes it deeply arguable whether 
or not they are in fact performed “mindlessly,” 
without conscious attention, or unintentionally.
Patients suffering from OCD are plagued by 
persistent, intrusive thoughts of threatening sce-
narios which elicit anxiety (obsessions), and they 
feel compelled to perform compulsive mental or 
physical acts as attempts to neutralize the thought 
or the threat it represents (Abramowitz, McKay, 
Taylor, 2008; Rachman, 1993). The most common 
compulsive acts include repetitive checking (of 
locks, stove, switches), washing, counting, reas-
surance seeking or unnecessary confessions, and 
repetitive attempts to attain symmetry (Attiullah 
et al., 2000).
Many experts believe that compulsions are 
goal-directed and voluntary acts which arise from 
the intense pressure to appease obsessive worries. 
Anand and Chandra (2014, p. 345), for instance, 
insist on the fact that: “compulsions are voluntary, 
goal-directed, non-rhythmic and under conscious 
control.” In a similar manner, the philosopher 
Judit Szalai (2016) insists on the voluntary nature 
of compulsive acts in OCD which, as she notes, 
are initiated by the agent as a means of control in 
response to intrusive thoughts. The agent is not 
passive in the performance but rather intends to 
deploy those actions for a reason.1
A first point that these theories make is that 
compulsive acts are exerted with the intention 
to avoid some catastrophe or negative outcome 
that the individual foresees. According to such a 
view, compulsions emerge from an extreme sense 
of responsibility and a heightened awareness of 
potential threats. Compulsive acts are performed 
out of excessive concern for the safety of oneself 
and others, and seem to serve a purpose: neutral-
izing thoughts of possible catastrophes involving 
contamination, murder, aggression, offense and 
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the like.2 Freeston and Ladouceur (1997, p. 344) 
define neutralizing as “a voluntary, effortful cogni-
tive or behavioral act that is directed at removing, 
preventing and attenuating the intrusive thought 
and the associated discomfort.” It is a conscious 
effort on the agent’s part to regain some control 
over their obsessive fears. Here is a case report 
from a consultation with a young mother with 
OCD, presented by Denys (2011):
When I’m alone at home and I see my daughter 
sleeping in her crib then I can see myself strangling 
her. I’m terribly shocked by the thought and I am 
very frightened by it … In the beginning I occa-
sionally thought about it, but now I think about 
it all the time. Though I realize that the thought 
is absurd, I can’t stop it … Whenever the thought 
occurs, I wash my hands. It seems that I can rinse 
this terrible thought away causing the anxiety to 
decrease. I have to do it exactly 8 times and am 
not allowed to touch anything else while washing 
or to think about my daughter. If I don’t do it 
properly, I have to start all over again.
If compulsions can then be characterized as ac-
tions performed out of concern and with a goal 
in mind, they are also performed with much fo-
cused attention. In fact, it has even been argued 
that compulsions in OCD are characterized by 
the tendency to exert too much conscious control 
and attention onto one’s actions (Arzeno Ferrão, 
Almeida, Bedin, Rosa, & D’Arrigo Busnello, 2006; 
Lochner & Stein, 2006).
A second point that these theories emphasize 
is the fact that OCD patients have a tendency to 
doubt the effectiveness of their action, and there-
fore tend to substitute automatic routine actions 
with controlled strategies. OCD is characterized 
by persistent doubting: persons suffering from the 
disorder may wash their hands until they bleed 
and still doubt whether they have washed them 
enough. As de Haan et al. (2013) note, when ex-
periencing this kind of doubt, patients typically 
repeat the action, paying extra attention to the 
sequence of movements.
Several authors have highlighted the idea that 
patients with OCD tend to substitute automatic 
routines with controlled strategies (Joel et al., 
2005; Salkovskis, 1998; Soref, Dar, Argov & 
Meiran, 2008). Persons with OCD, it is argued, 
tend to “replace the degree of somewhat intuitive 
certainty obtained by automatic processing by 
the certainty from well-elaborated actions” (Dek, 
van den Hout, Giele, & Engelhard, 2010, p. 586). 
According to this view, compulsions in OCD 
result from an inability to trust one’s habitual 
dispositions to correctly perform everyday, routine 
actions such as locking the door or washing one’s 
hands, rather than from an over-reliance on an 
intuitive and automatic mode of acting.
An associated hypothesis is that OCD patients 
apply effort in action for its own sake, rather than 
for the sake of accomplishing a given action prop-
erly. It has been hypothesized that patients with 
OCD may associate acting effortfully with acting 
in a responsible way (Van den Hout & Kindt, 
2004). Since patients with OCD typically worry 
about whether they are acting responsibly, deploy-
ing effortful strategies instead of habits might be 
a way to assuage this doubt. However, paying 
conscious attention to routine actions may trig-
ger more insecurity and doubt than reinsurance.
It appears as though OCD might constitute an 
enlightening example of important issues having 
to do with the interactions between spontaneity 
or unreflectivity in action, agentive control, and 
the successful performance of routine actions. 
I believe that some confusion in the debate on 
whether OCD patients exert too little or too much 
control on their actions hangs on what we mean by 
agentive control, and especially on what it means 
to lack control in action. An effort to determine in 
which way or according to which criterion com-
pulsions manifest a deficiency of agentive control 
may help us both understand compulsions and 
other disordered actions better, and also provide 
an opportunity to refine and enrich our view of 
agentive control. In the next section I present 
some hypotheses as to which elements need to 
be constitutive of agentive control so that we can 
account for the distinct ways in which persons 
suffering from pathologies of action may be said 
to lack control.
Compulsions and impulses i: 
laCking Control?
Agents who act habitually, compulsively and 
impulsively may all be said to lack control. How-
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ever, we should note that they lack control in 
significantly different ways. The term “control” 
has been used by theorists of action with quite 
different definitions in mind. I believe this is re-
sponsible in part for the contradictions we have 
exposed earlier, where, on the one hand, it is 
claimed that compulsive agents lack control and 
“behavioral flexibility,” and on the other, they 
are said to exert too much conscious control on 
the sequence of movements required to perform 
the compulsion. These two statements might not 
necessarily be contradictory; more plausibly, us-
ing the term “control” with regard to action, they 
refer to two different concepts. In what follows, I 
will first review two views of control: inhibitory 
control and guidance control, before proposing 
that a third view of control proves more useful.
According to a minimal view of control put 
forward by Dreyfus: “I am in control of my move-
ments in the sense that I can stop doing what I’m 
doing if I will to do so” (2002, p. 380). This defi-
nition creates a first, obvious distinction between 
habitual action on the one hand, and compulsive 
and impulsive action on the other: if agents who 
act habitually are able to easily stop performing 
their habitual action, agents who act compulsively 
or impulsively typically experience great difficul-
ties inhibiting their action, and are only able to 
do so at the cost of major effort (Pickard, 2011, 
2012). I believe it is with this concept of “inhibi-
tory control” in mind that Hanna Pickard (2011) 
proposes that there is in fact no compulsion, only 
impaired control, weak-will and hard choices. 
Even if the ability to do otherwise or to choose an 
alternative course of action is undermined in OCD, 
it is still rational to encourage the patient to use 
her power of will and determination to exercise 
her agency and limit the time spent performing 
compulsive acts.
On Dreyfus’s view of control, an agent who 
acts compulsively has “lost control” because he is 
apparently unable to stop performing an action. 
However, impulse control disorders are similarly 
characterized by a person’s inability to refrain 
from the urge to repetitively perform a particular 
act. Kleptomania for instance, can be defined as 
a “repetitive failure to resist urges to steal things 
that are not needed for personal use or for their 
monetary value” (Aboujaoude, 2008, p. 79). On 
this basis, we would thus still end up grouping 
together disorders of action such as OCD; pyroma-
nia, kleptomania, compulsive gambling (so-called 
“impulse-control disorders”) in the same cluster.
Another more sophisticated view of control 
suggests that it accounts for an agent’s ability to 
adjust her actions to changes in the environment, 
respond to both expected and unpredictable en-
vironment circumstances, and revise her strategy 
accordingly (Fridland, 2015). In the words of 
Fischer and Ravizza (1998), agents who lack con-
trol lack the ability to be receptive and reactive to 
reason. Again, on this view of control, both the 
impulsive and the compulsive seem to be equally 
able to receive and understand the reasons why 
they should act otherwise; the problem rather lies 
in the reaction, in the ability to use these reasons 
to form motivations which are strong enough. 
This theory of agentive control cannot account 
for the facts that (1) compulsions and impulses 
are underpinned by very different phenomenologi-
cal bases, and (2) they are guided by motivations 
which are different in nature.
These views of agentive control remain silent 
about the distinct ways in which agents who act 
compulsively and agents who act impulsively can 
be said to lack control. Still, as Cochrane and Hea-
ton (2017, p. 184) rightly emphasize, “we should 
not understand OCD as an impulse disorder … 
the OCD sufferer is in many ways the opposite of 
impulsive.” While they both act in ways which can 
be defined as inflexible and unreactive to reason, it 
is clear that we must distinguish between the agent 
who acts compulsively and the agent who acts im-
pulsively. We are, however, still missing the key to 
conceptually distinguish what opposes these two 
agents from the point of view of agentive control. 
In the next section I argue that a third view bears 
a more promising prospect in this regard.
Compulsions and impulses ii: 
opposite ends of the speCtrum
In which way might we refine our view of agen-
tive control so that it helps us to conceptually 
distinguish between disorders of action? As Wayne 
Wu (2016) points out, the problem with current 
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accounts of agentive control is that they ignore a 
central psychological capacity which is essential 
to control: attention.
Indeed, if we consider attentional focus as the 
central criterion of agentive control, the distinc-
tion between an agent who is in control and an 
agent who is not depends primarily on whether 
the agent is paying conscious, focused attention to 
his movements and the resulting outcomes in the 
world while performing the action. Viewed in this 
way, an action performed with much attentional 
focus will not be defined as uncontrolled. It is 
in this sense that compulsions can be said to be 
“under conscious control” (Anand & Chandra, 
2014), or defined as “controlled behavior” (Arden 
& Linford, 2008).
While the role of attention in philosophical 
theories of agentive control has long been ignored, 
a recent account of OCD by a philosopher puts 
attention at the root of the disorder. Coming from 
a predictive coding framework, Levy (2018) argues 
that the dysfunctional tendency of OCD sufferers 
to assign probabilities for threatening events arises 
from a prior dysfunction related to attention. On 
this account, both the symptoms and the particular 
cognitive dispositions of OCD sufferers arise from 
overly precise “pushmi-pullyu” sensory and motor 
representations (Millikan, 1995). Dysfunctionally 
heightened attention brings excessive precision 
to pushmi-pullyu representations which predict 
catastrophic scenarios. While Levy focuses on 
the role of disordered attention with regard to 
the prediction of feared outcomes, and not on 
the way heightened attention might affect action 
performance, the two accounts are compatible in 
that they put dysfunctionally heightened attention 
at the root of OCD. In fact, the idea that higher 
probabilities are assigned to threatening scenarios 
may well be what triggers the agent to pay extra 
attention to her actions. Levy’s theory thus pro-
vides a way of explaining how the prediction of 
negative outcomes (catastrophes, etc.) is connected 
in OCD patients with the desire to seek certainty 
and extinguish doubt.
Then, if we consider the attentional criterion, 
compulsions and impulses indeed appear, as Co-
chrane and Heaton suggest, at two opposite ends 
of the continuum of controlled action.3 Indeed, 
if compulsions can be considered as the result 
of too much attention exerted onto the perfor-
mance of routine actions, impulsive actions are 
rather generally viewed as instances in which 
the agent performs actions with little attention 
and consideration for the negative consequences. 
While the agent who acts compulsively exhibits 
a hyper-awareness of possible negative outcomes 
and scenarios, the impulsive agent only seems to 
experience such awareness after the action has 
been completed. Both of their behaviors are inflex-
ible, but the causal histories behind these behaviors 
are very different, and focusing on the criteria of 
attention helps to bring out the crucially different 
motivations driving these agents.4
Impulsivity is characterized by a strong urge to 
perform an act (such as stealing, in kleptomania) 
that is pleasurable in the moment but causes re-
morse afterwards (Aboujaoude, 2008). Compul-
sions rather originate from an extreme sense of 
responsibility, coupled with a heightened aware-
ness and overestimation of potential threats. While 
impulse-control disorders involve an intrinsic 
motivation, a positive reward—the perspective of 
a pleasurable experience—compulsions are rather 
performed to protect oneself against a threat that 
one perceives as catastrophic, and looming. If there 
is any phenomenological change to be gained from 
performing a compulsion, it is a return to a status 
quo: the absence of anxiety. This is a consider-
ation which bears profound consequences for our 
moral treatment of these two types of behavior. 
Indeed, “telling a compulsive handwasher to be 
temperate misses the point of why the behavior 
is performed” since in OCD the compulsive act is 
used as a way to reduce anxiety (Putman, 1997). 
OCD sufferers have to fight, not against strong 
desires, but against intruding fears. What they 
should be encouraged to cultivate is rather what 
Putman (1997) calls “psychological courage”, 
which he defines as the courage it takes to face 
our irrational fears and anxieties.
Reasonable agentive control may then be found 
somewhere in between these two excessive disposi-
tions: the disposition to pay too much attention 
to one’s actions while performing them, and the 
disposition to pay too little attention to one’s 
actions. But where exactly is the correct balance 
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between these two excesses to be found? How 
much should we actually resort to conscious at-
tention for our everyday actions? I will now turn 
to addressing this question, which will lead me 
to discuss the concept of habit as presented in the 
habit-formation theory of compulsions.
attention, intention, and aCtion
In the previous section, I have delineated three 
notions of control, tied respectively to inhibition, 
guidance, and attention. The idea that OCD 
might have to do with excessive attention paid to 
everyday actions may leave us wondering: when 
and how much do we actually pay conscious 
attention to our actions as we perform them? 
A somewhat disturbing yet plausible answer is: 
“most of a person’s life is determined not by their 
conscious intentions and deliberate choices but by 
features of the environment that operate outside 
of conscious awareness and guidance” (Bargh & 
Chatrand, 1999, p. 1). If this is right, we may be 
acting in an unreflective manner most of the time, 
and attentional control of action might only be 
deployed in particular cases, such as when we are 
trying to learn a new skill (Dreyfus, 2002) or when 
some unexpected or novel event occurs, and also 
perhaps when stakes are particularly high.
Otherwise, our actions are typically guided by 
automatic processes. Nonetheless, most of the 
time, our inclinations to act seem well guided: we 
respond appropriately to many situations without 
the need to deliberate or apply conscious atten-
tion. Furthermore, paying conscious attention to 
routine actions is not ideal; it is well known that 
heightened awareness can interfere with skilled, 
automatic routines, so that consciously attending 
to one’s movements can hinder the performance of 
the skill (Beilock, 2010; Di Nucci, 2013; Dreyfus, 
2007; Papineau, 2013). The fact that we often act 
without applying conscious attention to our move-
ments does not, however, necessarily mean that we 
are acting without a purpose, or unintentionally. 
This observation should lead us to question our 
view of habitual actions.
The intentional, goal-directed aspects of ac-
tions such as habitual actions, seem to have been 
until recently ignored or rejected. While I am here 
focusing on the contemporary philosophical litera-
ture, it is worth noting that the concept of habit 
has a long and complex history, which testifies to 
the dissensus on the nature of habit, and on the 
properties to be attributed to this type of actions. 
In their “genealogical map of the concept,” Ba-
randiaran and Di Paolo (2014) have identified two 
main trends in the history of the concept: an “as-
sociationist trend,” which conceives of habit as the 
passive result of an automatic association between 
stimulus and response, bearing no intentional or 
rational dimension, and an “organicist trend,” 
which conceives of habit as patterns that are in-
formed and formed by individual intentionality, 
and stabilized by their enactment. As the authors 
note, neuroscientific research on habit has been 
largely based on the former tradition.
Recent literature in the philosophy of action 
aims at expanding our largely associationist-
informed view of habit, and rehabilitating the in-
tentional, rational, dynamic properties of habit, by 
questioning the duality between, on the one hand, 
automatic and non-intentional processes, and on 
the other, dynamic and intentional processes. As 
Fridland (2015) rightly pointed out, a damaging 
consequence of “dual-system theories” of action is 
that it is often assumed that conscious, controlled, 
intentional processes are to be explained in con-
ceptual, propositional terms, while unconscious, 
automatic processes result from purely causal, 
mechanistic connections, independent of personal-
level intentional states. Habitual actions, while be-
ing guided by automatic processes, are intentional 
and context-sensitive actions. If environments had 
the power to directly trigger specific actions in us, 
we would all be displaying these same reflexes in 
a rigid and stereotyped manner. Far from being 
reducible to cases of “slips of action,” the ha-
bitual mode of action is one we rely on most of 
the time, and one which seems to be more flexible 
and intentionally driven than previously believed.
In a similar way in which the gymnast intends to 
perform her skilled actions on the bar (Friedland, 
2015), I intend to press the keys of my keyboard 
to write this sentence. That intention is formed 
somewhat automatically (it does not require ex-
plicit deliberation), but it is an intention all the 
same: my pressing these keys is not “accidental.” 
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Moreover, although most of my actions involve the 
(automatic) execution of sophisticated sequences 
of movements, they are nonetheless intentional: I 
intend to play the piano (although I do not need 
to deliberate on the way to move my fingers on 
the notes in a certain way); I intend to throw back 
the tennis ball (but not to move my arms at this 
precise angle and force); I intend to go downstairs 
(but not to move my feet in this specific manner), 
and so on. The fact that many of our everyday 
actions take the form of stimulus-response as-
sociations guided by automatic processes (be it in 
the decision-making or in the execution processes) 
does not make them stereotyped, rigid, and discon-
nected from personal-level intentions.
This should make us even more cautious about 
drawing parallels between compulsive action and 
habitual action. Referring to OCD patients’ ten-
dency for persistent doubting, Hookway remarks 
“If obsessively, we consider every possible doubt 
and demand reasons for every belief we employ in 
our reasoning, then we will be unable to exploit 
all the knowledge that is embodied in habits and 
emotional response” (2008, p. 64). While com-
pulsions in OCD are misled (by dysfunctional 
emotional and cognitive dispositions), rigid, and 
unresponsive to reasons, habits are informed, 
intentional, and flexible.
Notes
1. As Szalai remarks, some actions performed by 
OCD sufferers may become habitualized and partly au-
tomatic. In this case however, “we probably cannot talk 
of compulsive action any longer, only of habitualized 
movements that have lost their meaning” (2016, p. 56).
2. Note that this view may not be the most relevant 
for certain forms of compulsive behavior as found in 
chronic severe OCD. As already noted by Szalai (2016), 
these forms of compulsive behavior seem disconnected 
from intentions and subjective reasons. For less severe 
forms and earlier stages of OCD, however, the charac-
terization provided in this section seems relevant.
3. Lochner and Stein (2006) express a similar view: 
they group disorders of action linked to risk avoidance 
as belonging to the “compulsive” cluster which implies 
over-control of behavior, and “impulsive” disorders 
linked to disinhibition at the other end of the spectrum.
4. While the view proposed in this paper does not 
constitute a new explanation of the causes of OCD, it 
offers a clinically relevant re-conceptualization of the 
relationship between compulsions and the subject’s in-
ternal states and processes. Together with papers such 
as Levy’s (2018), it encourages therapeutic interventions 
that take the patient’s attentional strategies into account.
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